



“It thinks rather badly, but it thinks steadily. It is in these very 
terms that Freud announces the unconscious to us: thoughts 
that, while their laws are not exactly the same as those of our 
everyday thoughts, whether noble or vulgar, are certainly artic-
ulated”1. 
One of the central accomplishments of Freudian psychoanalysis is its 
examination of the ability to think. How thought is produced and who 
or what is producing it is much less unambiguous after the event of 
psychoanalysis, and of course the concept of the unconscious is the 
key protagonist of this reinterpretation. Psychoanalysis teaches, at the 
very least, that thinking is going on in us in ways that are not clear 
to ourselves. We are thinking more than we know, and although un-
conscious thought might not be following “exactly the same laws” as 
what we usually understand by (rational) thought, it is fundamentally 
important to acknowledge it as thought in order to understand the 
full extension of what thought can be. Dreams are a testimony to this. 
When we dream, we are thinking something that has not yet been 
recognized or that has been ruled out from the conscious mind. It ap-
pears in mysterious forms, but its very appearance is itself a testimo-
ny of something that cannot be reduced to merely somatic reactions 
or erratic leftovers of half-consumed impressions. Dreams need to be 
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interpreted, because they do not immediately present a recognizable 
content for our understanding, but they contain material nonetheless 
that might expand our knowledge of ourselves and the world around 
us. They are the result of a certain kind of work: A dream work which 
is also a work of thought. Freud is certain of this, and it is his certainty 
of the unconscious that marks the ontological break of psychoanaly-
sis: “It is because Freud declares the certainty of the unconscious that 
the progress by which he changed the world for us was made.”2 
This volume is inspired and guided by the basic Freudian insight that 
thoughts should be examined in forms and in places, where they are 
not immediately expected. The unconscious, to Freud, was ein anderer 
Schauplautz, another scene, and what the authors of the present collec-
tion have all set out to do is to explore various kinds of such scenes for 
their potential in the continued elaboration of the understanding of 
what it means to think.
Marisa Žele compares the figure of the “Trickster” from Biblical On-
tology with some of Freud’s writing on forgetfulness and demon-
strates how, in both cases, some of the essential processes are taking 
place behind the back of the subject. A form of thinking is going on, 
e.g., when Freud himself cannot remember a certain name (the name 
of the painter Signorelli), but comes up with alternatives that resem-
ble it to some extent. Forgetfulness in this case turns into “a complete-
ly self-governing process, over which the producer has no control”. 
The producer’s lack of control could also be a description of Lilian 
Munk Rösing’s take on thinking in art, when she investigates how 
thinking is going on in the very material itself: “… it is the moment 
when the real speaks instead of the symbolic signifiers, for instance 
when the body starts to speak instead of verbal language (as in the 
hysteric’s spasms and tics), or when the normally non-signifying ma-
terial of the words themselves (letters, sounds) starts to signify, as in 
slips and puns.” Anders Ruby investigates musical stage performances 
by means of Lacan’s four discourses and claims that a “master” on 
stage risks “losing it”, if mistakes, slips or irregularities start break-
ing through the otherwise perfect performance. In order to remain a 
master, he must repress and cannot therefore “fully relate to, cannot 
fully listen to” the effects of his own barred subjectivity. The business 
of psychoanalysis, of course, could precisely be said to be to listen to 
such irregularities. Cathrine Michaelsen compares artistic processes 
9
more explicitly with those that take place in psychoanalysis, when she 
describes how “… the writing of literature is not the result or the rep-
resentation of the writer’s intentions, thoughts, or wishes; on the con-
trary, it is the writing that demands and puts its claim on the writer 
who, in turn, remains strangely distanced from the automatic auton-
omy of the written.” Similarly, psychoanalysis is calling us to listen, 
not for what makes sense or is understood in the analysand’s speech, 
but for “the ring of being not the same with oneself”, as Amanda 
Holmes puts it in her contribution in which she also unfolds Lacan’s 
critical reaction (to say the least) to Karl Jaspers’ understanding of 
understanding.
Tadej Troha moves one step further into Freud’s own theorization of 
concrete case stories and particularly Freud’s description of the Wolf 
Man, whose thoughts, Freud claimed, had already been occupied with 
the possibility of castration before his (alleged) witnessing of the pri-
mal scene at a very young age. Again, a kind of thinking has to be 
assumed, which predates, escapes, counteracts or supplements the 
thinking that is commonly understood as such.
The final four contributions engage more extensively with philo-
sophical authors’ takes on the thinking that does not reduce itself to 
conscious processes of sovereign subjects. Brian Benjamin Hansen en-
gages with Hegel’s examples and claims that thinking begins, when 
a concept is forced out of its only apparent self-sufficiency. If God is 
defined as being, he is no longer simply God, but also something else, 
and “thinking is this very movement back and forth in a sentence, in a 
philosophical exposition, where subject becomes substance, and sub-
stance becomes subject.” Henrik Jøker Bjerre also thematises a move-
ment in philosophical thought, but in his contribution, the movement 
in question is the one that can be discerned in Kierkegaard’s author-
ship, particularly with regards to the staging of the authorship in elab-
orate relations of sources, authors and publishers (with or without 
pseudonyms): Kierkegaard was not merely exclaiming his insights, 
but much rather investigating the thoughts that appeared in writing; 
“creating an analytical setting, which made it possible for the author 
to turn into a reader of his own thoughts”. Finally, in the two articles 
that thematise Martin Heidegger’s conception of thinking, Kirsten 
Hyldgaard first proposes that Heidegger’s understanding of thought 
without a consciousness and thought without a subject can be com-
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pared to Lacan’s elaboration of the psychoanalytic concept of the sub-
ject of the unconscious: “Thinking”, in Heideggerian terms, “is not a 
meditative, reflective phenomenon; thinking is something that may 
occur, “ereignet”, and this event, “Ereignis”, concerns truth”. In a 
similar vein, “psychoanalysis does not analyze the psyche but speech; 
an analyst is someone who can listen”, and therefore analysis enables 
us to “hear the effects of the unconscious in the spoken word.” Morten 
Ziethen goes on to investigate how what is “given” in thought can 
be conceptualized as something that “does not come up because man 
wants it or intends it” without resigning to a passive understanding 
of human subjectivity as determined or decided by some inscrutable 
force beyond our grasp. His answer, on behalf of the later Heideg-
ger, is that being human does not mean that we ourselves provide the 
content of our thoughts, but that we are nonetheless called upon to 
respond to it.
The present issue hopefully gives something for its readers to think. 
How they will respond is certainly an open question.
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